Palantir Pushes Beyond What Any Other System Can Do It Seems

August 13, 2021

I believe everything I read online. Don’t you. I spotted this interesting article: “Palantir: Revolutionizing Big Data Analytics.” The write up shows a Covid dashboard and focuses on what’s called “data integration.” Putting information in an index or series of indexes so a user or software can run a query across that which has been placed in said indexes is sometimes called “federation”. Without entering a rabbit hole, let’s accept the “data integration” idea and ignore the buzzwords like “cross function collaborations.”

The Palantir system has a four step “process flow.” These steps include:

  • Aggregating data
  • Transforming data
  • Securing data
  • Empowering data.

I track with the first three steps, which have been required by policeware and intelware systems for decades.

The baffler is “empowering” data. I think this means that Palantir data are more valuable, potent, or muscular than data in a system for which I was a consultant many years ago. That was the i2 Analysts Notebook from the late 1990s.

That’s neither here nor there because Palantir did the Silicon Valley thing and found inspiration in that pioneering i2 system, which is now owned by IBM.

But here’s the statement in the write up that left me scratching my head:

Palantir is different from traditional business intelligence solutions like Tableau, Alteryx, or Cloudera, as it’s able to answer questions that a regular model isn’t able to. Questions such as “What steps should be taken if there’s another global pandemic”, or “How to increase margins in the most effective way”.

The companies cited in the passage are not intelware or policeware centric. Second, Palantir seems to be able to process natural language queries, extract on point facts and data from the aggregated and transformed data, and deliver answers.

As far as I know, NLP system do not reliably field ad hoc questions about general business issues or warfighting/intelligence issues. If systems did, there would not be the grousing about training, complexity, and disused intelware due to complexity and instability.

I don’t want to suggest that Palantir cannot deliver NLP which works. I would like to gently suggest that this just may not work in a way which would be useful in certain situations.

I understand the reasons “traditional” intelware fails. Managing data and logic together is tricky and made more challenging and expensive because real time streams can be ingested into some intelware systems. Specialists exist to deal with the real time challenge, and I am not sure Palantir has the robustness of Trendalyze, for example.

The data integrity issue is a big deal. Palantir makes it possible to know who input data. But the integrity issue is larger than than a single person. There are vendors who assemble data sets. Automated data sets work okay too, but when a stream is lost from an authorized intercept, the data set takes a hit. Plus, there is just bad data; for example, variable mechanisms for counting Covid deaths. Has Palantir whipped this garbage in problem? Maybe.

One weakness of Palantir’s competitors is described this way:

The inability to define key business metrics transparently in a common data foundation

This is an ambiguous statement. Most managers don’t know what they need or want. A case in point is a cyber security vendor offering phishing protection to clients. What happens if phishing techniques rely on auto generated emails with smart software crafting the pitch and the inclusion of valid links to the recipient’s company’s Web site. How is an employee to recognize these malformed email? We know phishing systems are not working because of the notable breaches in the US and elsewhere in the last six months of 2021. Senior managers want answers, and hopefully the answers are “good” or at least don’t lead to a diplomatic crisis or a severe business impact. Has Palantir cracked the problem of people who say, “I know what I want when I see it.” In my experience, quite a few CxOs rely on this method. Unfortunately this is not 1690 in Rhode Island where the vigilant are on the look out for irritated Native Americans. Recognizing that eye ball glimmering in a bush is not something intelware systems are able to do in a reliable, economical, speedy way.

Finally, the Palantir competitors “lack flexibility due to rigid data assets.” I remember the sales pitch of MarkLogic, a vendor of slicing-and-dicing content systems. The idea is that XML was almost magical. Input parameters and one gets output like a book made up of relevant content from the objects in the database. XML is a useful tool, but based on my experience with intelware systems, most of them use structured files, open source software, and the same popular algorithms taught in CompSci 401 around the world. The flexibility issue is a big one because now intelware must make sense of audio, video, pictures, gifs, database files, proprietary files from legacy systems, consumer file types like Word, and numeric streams. The phrase “rigid data assets” does quite capture the nuances of the data chaos facing most organizations.

Net net: This is an interesting write up, but I think it needs evidence, and substantive information. Palantir certainly has magnetism, but I still ask myself:

Why is Palantir funding SPACs and allegedly requiring these firms to agree to license the Palantir system?

This is a mystery to me. Because if Palantir whipped NLP, for instance, or the data chaos problem, the company would the hottest thing since i2 Analysts Notebook.

Stephen E Arnold, August 13, 2021

NSO Group: Let Loose the Legal Eagles

August 13, 2021

I was dismayed to read “More Journalists File Legal Complaints after Being Targeted by Pegasus Surveillance Software.” Outrage and finger pointing are obviously not enough. According to the article:

The list of legal challenges against NSO Group continues to mount after 17 additional journalists from seven countries have filed complaints with prosecutors in Paris, France. To date, international media freedom organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and two French/Moroccan journalists have filed cases in court over serious concerns that their governments were spying on them due to their work as journalists, carrying out vital public interest investigations. The latest journalists to file complaints include Sevinc Abassova from Azerbaijan, Szabolcs Panyi and Andras Szabo from Hungary, and others from India, Togo, and Mexico. Among the other complainants are Shubhranshu Choudhary, an RSF correspondent in India, and two RSF Award Winners, Hicham Mansouri from Morocco and Swati Chaturvedi from India.

I am not an attorney. I have enough challenges just being a retired, chubby consultant. Several points seem salient to me:

  1. NSO Group is essentially the intelware equivalent of the protagonist in Nat Hawthorne’s zippy thriller, The Scarlet Letter.
  2. The legal process is tough to manage when it involves a single matter in a single jurisdiction. A pride of filings exponentiates the complexities and the likelihood of some intriguing decisions. Say “hello” to high risk litigating.
  3. The ripple effect of the intelware disclosures is going to intersect with an unrelated security action taken by Apple Computer. The NSO Group matter will raise the stakes for the trillion dollar company everyone once associated with user privacy.

Net net: Excitement ahead. Buckle up.

Stephen E Arnold, August 13, 2021

NSO Group: Origins

August 11, 2021

I read “Israel Tries to Limit Fallout from the Pegasus Spyware Scandal.”

I noted this statement which is has been previously bandied about:

Israel has been trying to limit the damage the Pegasus spyware scandal is threatening to do to France-Israel relations. The Moroccan intelligence service used the software, made by an Israeli company with close ties to Israel’s defense and intelligence establishments, to spy on dozens of French officials, including fourteen current and former cabinet ministers, among them President Emmanuel Macron and former prime minister Edouard Phillipe.

The write up reports:

There were reasons for Macron’s irritation: The NSO Group was established in 2009 by three Israelis — Niv Carmi, Shalev Hulio, and Omri Lavie. Contrary to popular belief, the three were not veterans of the vaunted Unit 8200, the IDF’s signal intelligence branch (although many of the company’s employees are). It is generally accepted by intelligence services around the world that many Israeli high-tech companies share information they glean from their contracts abroad with the Israeli security services, if they think such information is vital to Israel’s security (this is why the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, has been reluctant to allow Israeli cyber companies access to the U.S. market).

Interesting.

Stephen E Arnold, August 11, 2021

Another Perturbation of the Intelware Market: Apple Cores Forbidden Fruit

August 6, 2021

It may be tempting for some to view Apple’s decision to implement a classic man-in-the-middle process. If the information in “Apple Plans to Scan US iPhones for Child Abuse Imagery” is correct, the maker of the iPhone has encroached on the intelware service firms’ bailiwick. The paywalled newspaper reports:

Apple intends to install software on American iPhones to scan for child abuse imagery

The approach — dubbed ‘neuralMatch’ — is on the iPhone device, thus providing functionality substantially similar to other intelware vendors’ methods for obtaining data about a user’s actions.

The article concludes:

According to people briefed on the plans, every photo uploaded to iCloud in the US will be given a “safety voucher” saying whether it is suspect or not. Once a certain number of photos are marked as suspect, Apple will enable all the suspect photos to be decrypted and, if apparently illegal, passed on to the relevant authorities.

Observations:

  1. The idea allows Apple to provide a function likely to be of interest to law enforcement and intelligence professionals; for example, requesting a report about a phone with filtered and flagged data are metadata
  2. Specialized software companies may have an opportunity to refine existing intelware or develop a new category of specialized services to make sense of data about on-phone actions
  3. The proposal, if implemented, would create a PR opportunity for either Apple or its critics to try to leverage
  4. Legal issues about the on-phone filtering and metadata (if any) would add friction to some legal matters.

One question: How similar is this proposed Apple service to the operation of intelware like that allegedly available from the Hacking Team, NSO Group, and other vendors? Another question: Is this monitoring a trial balloon or has the system and method been implemented in test locations; for example, China or an Eastern European country?

Stephen E Arnold, August 6, 2021

NSO Group: A Somewhat Interesting Comment

August 5, 2021

I read on August 5, 2021, “Israeli Government Finally Decides To Start Looking Into NSO Group And Its Customers.” The write up contained the interesting word “finally.” There’s nothing like criticizing a government agency for an easy pot shot. But here’s the passage which caught my attention:

 the Israeli government has opened its own… something… of NSO Group. But this inquiry is moving much more cautiously with local agencies showing much less urgency.

I think the “delay” suggests differential time measurements. Some government agencies do the mañana thing; others have a cadence set to hippity hop time.

The evidence is in and the judgment is rendered:

This seems to indicate that the list of numbers is actually related to NSO Group and potential targets of its customer base. If the list has nothing to do with NSO or its customers — as NSO has claimed — it likely wouldn’t feel compelled to cut off customers and/or curtail their use of Pegasus malware. While this isn’t an explicit admission of culpability by NSO, the implication is that the company sold its products to governments it knew would abuse them to surveil people they didn’t like, rather than just criminals and terrorists.

Intriguing because specific factual information about the delta in time perceptions is ignored. Just go to the conclusion. Helpful.

Stephen E Arnold, August 5, 2021

NSO Group and France: Planning a Trip to Grenoble? Travel Advisory Maybe?

August 3, 2021

The PR poster kid for intelware captured more attention from the Guardian. “Pegasus Spyware Found on Journalists’ Phones, French Intelligence Confirms” reports in “real news” fashion:

French intelligence investigators have confirmed that Pegasus spyware has been found on the phones of three journalists, including a senior member of staff at the country’s international television station France 24. It is the first time an independent and official authority has corroborated the findings of an international investigation by the Pegasus project – a consortium of 17 media outlets, including the Guardian.

The consistently wonderful and objective, media hip newspaper provided a counter argument to this interesting finding:

NSO said Macron was not and never had been a “target” of any of its customers, meaning the company denies he was selected for surveillance or was surveilled using Pegasus. The company added that the fact that a number appeared on the list was in no way indicative of whether that number was selected for surveillance using Pegasus.

Is NSO Group adopting a Facebook- or Google-type of posture? I think response to implied criticism is to say stuff and nod in a reassuring manner? I don’t know. The Guardian, ever new media savvy, wraps up the PR grenade with this comment:

The investigation suggests widespread and continuing abuse of Pegasus, which NSO insists is only intended for use against criminals and terrorists.

Should NSO Group professionals consider a visit to France and a side trip to Grenoble in order to ride Les Bulles?

Stephen E Arnold, August 3, 2021

NSO Group: Now the Women Allegedly Harmed Gain Media Traction. Wowza!

August 2, 2021

I read “I Will Not Be Silenced: Women Targeted in Hack and Leak Attacks Speak Out about Spyware.” My first reaction to the story was, “How many college sociology and poli-sci classes will make NSO Group, its product Pegasus, and the implications of “targeting” a subject for a case study, discussion groups, and papers? My second thought was, “NSO Group has been able to watch the ripples of intelware crashing against the awareness of the naïve, the clueless, and the mobile phone addicts.”

I don’t know if the peacock’s news report is accurate or just one of those weird bird noises made by the species. That probably doesn’t matter because the write up pulls in women and hooks intelware to a quite magnetic topic: The treatment of women.

The peacock squawked:

Female journalists and activists say they had their private photos shared on social media by governments seeking to intimidate and silence them.

Now that’s a heck of an assertion. True or not, the idea of “personal” pix nestling in distributed and local storage devices is not something that most people want to have happen.

Here’s a quote from the write up, and it will be interesting to watch how the crisis management advisors to NSO Group tap dance across this allegedly true statement:

“I am used to being harassed online. But this was different,” she added. “It was as if someone had entered my home, my bedroom, my bathroom. I felt so unsafe and traumatized.”

That’s a whiz bang statement which drags in nuances of privacy invasion and personal safety. Let’s call a meeting and maybe issue another feel good, make streets safer story. Yeah, how’s that working out?

The write up has another quote that glues NSO Group to the notion of freedom. Hello, Israel?

“Pegasus is a spyware tool and a weapon used against freedom of the press, freedom of expression, human rights activism and journalism,” said Rasha Abdul Rahim, director of Amnesty Tech, a division of Amnesty International focused on technology and surveillance tools. “Women’s freedom of expression is abused and targeted in a very specific way both online and offline. “The focus is on silencing them, putting the attention on their bodies or what they should be wearing or saying,” she added.

I have noticed that more people are aware of intelware as a result of this NSO Group toe stubbing.

What about those intelligence conference organizers? How about those experts pitching intel-related conferences on LinkedIn? What about those nifty white papers on intelware vendors’ Web sites?

My thought is that as more content is downloaded and more of the journalists chasing NSO Group info punch their searches into the Google, the more those ripples will be agitated.

Yikes. No easy fix it seems. Chasing revenues and making intelware into a household word are problematic. Many entities are likely to be suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. PR is good until it is not.

Stephen E Arnold, August 2, 2021

NSO Group and an Alert Former French Diplomat: Observation Is Often Helpful

August 2, 2021

I read “French Ex-Diplomat Saw Potential for Misuse While Working at NSO.” The allegedly accurate write up reports that Gerard Araud [once a French ambassador] took a position at NSO Group. The write up adds:

His one-year mission from September 2019, along with two other external consultants from the United States, was to look at how the company could improve its human rights record after a host of negative news stories. Earlier that year, the group’s technology had been linked publicly to spying or attempted spying on the murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabian security forces, which it denied. The group was acquired in 2019 by a London-based private equity group, Novalpina, which hired Araud to recommend ways to make the company’s safeguard procedures “more rigorous and a bit more systematic,” he said.

The write up explains how a prospect becomes an NSO Group customer:

Its [the Pegasus software and access credentials] export is regulated “like an arms sale,” said Araud, meaning NSO must seek approval from the Israeli government to sell it, and state clients then sign a lengthy commercial contract stipulating how the product will be used. They are meant to deploy Pegasus only to tackle organised crime or terrorism — the company markets itself this way — but Araud said “you could see all the potential for misuse, even though the company wasn’t always responsible.”

The argute veteran of the French ambassadorial team maybe, possibly, could have discerned the potential for misuse of the Pegasys system.

The write up includes this information, allegedly direct from the former diplomat, who obviously provides information diplomatically:

In a firm that practices “a form of extreme secrecy,” he says he nonetheless became convinced that NSO Group worked with Israel’s Mossad secret services, and possibly with the CIA. He said there were three Americans who sat on the group’s advisory board with links to the US intelligence agency, and the company has said that its technology cannot be used to target US-based numbers.  “There’s a question about the presence of Mossad and the CIA. I thought it was both of them, but I have no proof,” he said. “But I suspect they’re both behind it with what you call a ‘backdoor’.” A “backdoor” is a technical term meaning the security services would be able to monitor the deployment of Pegasus and possibly the intelligence gathered as a result.

Interesting. Several years ago, the BBC published “When Is a Diplomat Really Just a Spy?” In that 2018 write up, the Beeb stated:

So where do you draw the line between official diplomacy and the murky world of espionage? “Every embassy in the world has spies,” says Prof Anthony Glees, director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham. And because every country does it, he says there’s “an unwritten understanding” that governments are prepared to “turn a blind eye” to what goes on within embassies.

Would French diplomats have some exposure to ancillary duties at a French embassy? Potentially.

Stephen E Arnold, August 3, 2021

NSO Group: Talking and Not Talking Is Quite a Trick

July 30, 2021

I read “A Tech Firm Has Blocked Some Governments from Using Its Spyware over Misuse Claims.” First, let’s consider the headline. If the headline is factual, the message I get is that NSO Group operates one or more servers through which Pegasus traffic flows. Thus, the Pegasus system includes one or more servers which have log files, uptime monitoring, and administrative tools which permit operations like filtering, updating, and the like. Thus, a systems administrator with authorized access to one or a fleet of NSO Group servers supporting Pegasus can do what some system administrators do: Check out what’s shakin’ with the distributed system. Is the headline accurate? I sure don’t know, but the implication of the headline (assuming it is not a Google SEO ploy to snag traffic) is that NSO Group is in a position to know — perhaps in real time via a nifty AWS-type dashboard — who is doing what, when, where, for how long, and other helpful details about which a curious observer finds interesting, noteworthy, or suitable for assessing an upcharge. Money is important in zippy modern online systems in my experience.

My goodness. That headline was inspirational.

What about the write up itself from the real news outfit National Public Radio or NPR, once home to Bob Edwards, who was from Louisville, not far from the shack next to a mine run off pond outside my door. Ah, Louisville, mine drainage, and a person who finds this passage suggestive:

“There is an investigation into some clients. Some of those clients have been temporarily suspended,” said the source in the company, who spoke to NPR on condition of anonymity because company policy states that NSO “will no longer be responding to media inquiries on this matter and it will not play along with the vicious and slanderous campaign.”

So the company won’t talk to the media, but does talk to the media, specifically NPR. What do I think about that? Gee, I just don’t know. Perhaps I don’t understand the logic of NSO Group. But I don’t grasp what “unlimited” means when a US wireless provider assures customers that they have unlimited bandwidth. I am just stupid.

Next, I noted:

NSO says it has 60 customers in 40 countries, all of them intelligence agencies, law enforcement bodies and militaries. It says in recent years, before the media reports, it blocked its software from five governmental agencies, including two in the past year, after finding evidence of misuse. The Washington Post reported the clients suspended include Saudi Arabia, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and some public agencies in Mexico. The company says it only sells its spyware to countries for the purpose of fighting terrorism and crime, but the recent reports claim NSO dealt with countries known to engage in surveillance of their citizens and that dozens of smartphones were found to be infected with its spyware.

Okay, if the headline is on the beam, then NSO Group, maybe some unnamed Israeli government agencies like the unit issuing export licenses for NSO Group-type software, and possibly some “trusted” third parties are going to prowl through the data about the usage of Pegasus by entities. Some of these agencies may be quite secretive. Imagine the meetings going on in which those in these secret agencies. What will the top dogs in these secret outfits about the risks of having NSO Group’s data sifted, filtered, and processed by Fancy Dan analytics’ systems tell their bosses? Yeah, that will test the efficacy of advanced degrees, political acumen, and possible fear.

And what’s NSO Group’s position. The information does not come from an NSO Group professional who does not talk to the media but sort of does. Here’s the word from the NSO Group’s lawyer:

Shmuel Sunray, who serves as general counsel to NSO Group, said the intense scrutiny facing the company was unfair considering its own vetting efforts.

“What we are doing is, what I think today is, the best standard that can be done,” Sunray told NPR. “We’re on the one hand, I think, the world leaders in our human rights compliance, and the other hand we’re the poster child of human rights abuse.”

I like this. We have the notion of NSO Group doing what it can do to the “best standard.” How many times has this situation faced an outfit in the intelware game, based in Herliya, and under the scrutiny of an Israeli agency which says yes or no to an export license for a Pegasus type system. Is this a new situation? Might be. If true, what NSO Group does will define the trajectory of intelware going forward, won’t it?

Next, I like the “world leaders” and “Human rights compliance.” This line creates opportunities for some what I would call Comedy Central comments. I will refrain and just ask you to consider the phrase in the context of the core functions and instrumentality of intelware. (If you want to talk in detail, write benkent2020 at yahoo dot com and one of my team will get back to you with terms and fees. If not, I am retired, so I don’t care.)

Exciting stuff and the NSO Group ice cream melt is getting stickier by the day. And in Herzliya, the temperature is 29 C. “C” is the grade I would assign to this  allegedly accurate statement from the article that NSO Group does not talk to the media. Get that story straight is my advice.

And, gentle NPR news professional, why not ask the lawyer about log file retention and access to data in Pegasus by an NSO system administrator?

Stephen E Arnold, July 30, 2021

Digital Kudzu: Constant Gardeners Arrive at the NSO Group Orangerie

July 29, 2021

Is this a line from a motion picture? “Hello, we’re from the government and we’re here to help you.” I can’t remember. But constant gardeners do make visits to places where stuff grows, even in 2021 in the midst of a spike in respiratory diseases and quite toasty 31 C weather with some inclement weather expected.

I read “Israel Begins Investigation into NSO Group Spyware Abuse.” I am never sure about the accuracy of information when the source is one of Jeffrey Epstein’s sources of academic inspiration. (Wasn’t there some fancy wordsmithing about MIT’s interactions with this high water mark of human interaction?) As M. Macron might say, “Petits pois.” So shall we assume that the “Israel Begins…” article is in the capable hands of an honest vendeur de fruits, shall we?

The write up asserts:

The Ministry of Defense did not specify which government agencies were involved in the investigation, but Israeli media previously reported that the foreign ministry, justice ministry, Mossad, and military intelligence were also looking into the company following the report. NSO Group CEO Shalev Hulio confirmed to MIT Technology Review that the visit had taken place but continued the company’s denials that the list published by reporters was linked to Pegasus.

Ah, a coincidence. There are so many in the modern world. Example, you want? Less driving during Covid, more traffic deaths? See coincidence.

The write up notes:

NSO is not the only Israeli hacking company in the news lately. Microsoft and the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab also recently reported on hacking tools developed by Candiru that were subsequently used to target civil society groups.

Yep, Candiru. But are there other specialized software firms which the Israeli government might call, text, email, or Facetime? I don’t know from nothing because the Epstein-fave MIT “real” journalists did not mention any other firms. Am I to conclude that NSO Group and the Candiru outfit are rare birds, almost one of a kind?

Is it possible that NSO Group’s comments, the government’s alleged visit, and the grousing from the land of a couple of hundred different types of cheese are like the complaints of irritated customers of the orangerie’s delicate comestibles? If you got money, you can buy what the French call fruits mystérieux, right?

Observations:

  1. A visit in itself is surprising in the midst of a surge in Israel
  2. There indeed other firms providing specialized services, but these have been fortunate enough or wise enough to remain in the shed at rear of the orangeries in Herzliya
  3. The MIT Review is saddled with that Epstein thing; thus, it is difficult to do much more than ask, “Is this the rest of the story?”

Worth watching. Because fruits mystérieux. The care of constant gardeners may be needed. Could it be too late? Could the blight migrate to haricots verts, tomates allongées, and petit avocats.

Avocats? Fruits or conseillers juridique?

Stephen E Arnold, July 29, 2021

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