The Fixed Network Lawful Interception Business is Booming
September 11, 2024
It is not just bad actors who profit from an increase in cybercrime. Makers of software designed to catch them are cashing in, too. The Market Research Report 224 blog shares “Fixed Network Lawful Interception Market Region Insights.” Lawful interception is the process by which law enforcement agencies, after obtaining the proper warrants of course, surveil circuit and packet-mode communications. The report shares findings from a study by Data Bridge Market Research on this growing sector. Between 2021 and 2028, this market is expected to grow by nearly 20% annually and hit an estimated value of $5,340 million. We learn:
“Increase in cybercrimes in the era of digitalization is a crucial factor accelerating the market growth, also increase in number of criminal activities, significant increase in interception warrants, rising surge in volume of data traffic and security threats, rise in the popularity of social media communications, rising deployment of 5G networks in all developed and developing economies, increasing number of interception warrants and rising government of both emerging and developed nations are progressively adopting lawful interception for decrypting and monitoring digital and analog information, which in turn increases the product demand and rising virtualization of advanced data centers to enhance security in virtual networks enabling vendors to offer cloud-based interception solutions are the major factors among others boosting the fixed network lawful interception market.”
Furthermore, the pace of these developments will likely increase over the next few years. The write-up specifies key industry players, a list we found particularly useful:
“The major players covered in fixed network lawful interception market report are Utimaco GmbH, VOCAL TECHNOLOGIES, AQSACOM, Inc, Verint, BAE Systems., Cisco Systems, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Atos SE, SS8 Networks, Inc, Trovicor, Matison is a subsidiary of Sedam IT Ltd, Shoghi Communications Ltd, Comint Systems and Solutions Pvt Ltd – Corp Office, Signalogic, IPS S.p.A, ZephyrTel, EVE compliancy solutions and Squire Technologies Ltd among other domestic and global players.”
See the press release for notes on Data Bridge’s methodology. It promises 350 pages of information, complete with tables and charts, for those who purchase a license. Formed in 2014, Data Bridge is based in Haryana, India.
Cynthia Murrell, September 11, 2024
Preligens Is Safran.ai
September 9, 2024
Preligens, a French AI and specialized software company, is now part of Safran Electronics & Defense which is a unit of the Safran Group. I spotted a report in Aerotime. “Safran Accelerates AI Development with $243M Purchase of French-Firm Preligens” reported on September 2, 2024. The report quotes principles to the deal as saying:
“Joining Safran marks a new stage in Preligens’ development. We’re proud to be helping create a world-class AI center of expertise for one of the flagships of French industry. The many synergies with Safran will enable us to develop new AI product lines and accelerate our international expansion, which is excellent news for our business and our people,” Jean-Yves Courtois, CEO of Preligens, said. The CEO of Safran Electronics & Defense, Franck Saudo, said that he was “delighted” to welcome Preligens to the company.
The acquisition does not just make Mr. Saudo happy. The French military, a number of European customers, and the backers of Preligens are thrilled as well. In my lectures about specialized software companies, I like to call attention to this firm. It illustrates that technology innovation is not located in one country. Furthermore it underscores the strong educational system in France. When I first learned about Preligens, one rumor I heard was that on of the US government entities wanted to “invest” in the company. For a variety of reasons, the deal went no place faster than a bus speeding toward La Madeleine. If you spot me at a conference, you can ask about French technology firms and US government processes. I have some first hand knowledge starting with “American fries in a Congressional lunch facility.”
Preligens is important for three reasons:
- The firm developed an AI platform; that is, the “smart software” is not an afterthought which contrasts sharply with the spray paint approach to AI upon which some specialized software companies have been relying
- The smart software outputs identification data; for example, a processed image can show an aircraft. The Preligens system identifies the aircraft by type
- The user of the Preligens system can use time analyses of imagery to draw conclusions. Here’s a hypothetical because the actual example is not appropriate for a free blog written by a dinobaby. Imagine a service van driving in front of an embassy in Paris. The van makes a pass every three hours for two consecutive days. The Preligens system can “notice” this and alert an operator.
I will continue to monitor the system which will be doing business with selected entities under the name Safran.ai.
Stephen E Arnold, September 9, 2024
Microsoft and Palantir: Moving Up to Higher Impact Levels
August 20, 2024
Microsoft And Palantir Sell AI Spyware To Us Government
While AI is making the news about how it will end jobs, be used for deep fakes, and overturn creativity industries, there’s something that’s not being mentioned: spyware. The Verge writes about how two big technology players are planning to bring spyware to the US government: “Palantir Partners With Microsoft To Sell AI To The Government.”
Palantir and Microsoft recently announced they will combine their software to power services for US defense and intelligence services. Microsoft’s large language models (LLMs) will be used via Azure OpenAI Service with Palantir’s AI Platforms (AIP). These will be used through Microsoft’s classified government cloud environments. This doesn’t explain exactly what the combination of software will do, but there’s speculation.
Palantir is known for its software that analyses people’s personal data and helping governments and organizations with surveillance. Palantir has been very successful when it comes to government contracts:
“Despite its large client list, Palantir didn’t post its first annual profit until 2023. But the AI hype cycle has meant that Palantir’s “commercial business is exploding in a way we don’t know how to handle,” the company’s chief executive officer Alex Carp told Bloomberg in February. The majority of its business is from governments, including that of Israel — though the risk factors section of its annual filing notes that it does not and will not work with “the Chinese communist party.””
Eventually the details about Palantir’s and Microsoft’s partnership will be revealed. It probably won’t be off from what people imagine, but it is guaranteed to be shocking.
Whitney Grace, August 20, 2024
NSO Group Determines Public Officials Are Legitimate Targets
July 12, 2024
Well, that is a point worth making if one is the poster child of the specialized software industry.
NSO Group, makers of the infamous Pegasus spyware, makes a bold claim in a recent court filing: “Government and Military Officials Fair Targets of Pegasus Spyware in All Cases, NSO Group Argues,” reports cybersecurity news site The Record. The case at hand is Pegasus’ alleged exploitation of a WhatsApp vulnerability back in 2019. Reporter Suzanne Smalley cites former United Nations official David Kaye, who oversaw the right to free expression at that time. Smalley writes:
“Friday’s filing seems to suggest a broader purpose for Pegasus, Kaye said, pointing to NSO’s explanation that the technology can be used on ‘persons who, by virtue of their positions in government or military organizations, are the subject of legitimate intelligence investigations.’ ‘This appears to be a much more extensive claim than made in 2019, since it suggests that certain persons are legitimate targets of Pegasus without a link to the purpose for the spyware’s use,’ said Kaye, who was the U.N.’s special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression from 2014 to 2020. … The Israeli company’s statement comes as digital forensic researchers are increasingly finding Pegasus infections on phones belonging to activists, opposition politicians and journalists in a host of countries worldwide. NSO Group says it only sells Pegasus to governments, but the frequent and years-long discoveries of the surveillance technology on civil society phones have sparked a public uproar and led the U.S. government to crack down on the company and commercial spyware manufacturers in general.”
See the article for several examples of suspected targets around the world. We understand both the outrage and the crack down. However, publicly arguing about the targets of spyware may have unintended consequences. Now everyone knows about mobile phone data exfiltration and how that information can be used to great effect.
As for the WhatsApp court case, it is proceeding at the sluggish speed of justice. In March 2024, a California federal judge ordered NSO Group to turn over its secret spyware code. What will be the verdict? When will it be handed down? And what about the firm’s senior managers?
Cynthia Murrell, July 12, 2024
Meta Case Against Intelware Vendor Voyager Lags to Go Forward
June 21, 2024
Another clever intelware play gets trapped and now moves to litigation. Meta asserts that when Voyager Labs scraped data on over 600,000 Facebook users, it violated its contract. Furthermore, it charges, the scraping violated anti-hacking laws. While Voyager insists the case should be summarily dismissed, U.S. District Court Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin disagrees. MediaDailyNews reports, “Meta Can Proceed With Claims that Voyager Labs Scraped Users’ Data.” Writer Wendy Davis explains:
“Voyager argued the complaint should be dismissed at an early stage for several reasons. Among others, Voyager said the allegations regarding Facebook’s terms of service were too vague. Meta’s complaint ‘refers to a catchall category of contracts … but then says nothing more about those alleged contracts, their terms, when they are supposed to have been executed, or why they allegedly bind Voyager UK today,’ Voyager argued to Martinez-Olguin in a motion filed in February. The company also said California courts lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the company violated federal or state anti-hacking laws. Martinez-Olguin rejected all of Voyager’s arguments on Thursday. She wrote that while Meta’s complaint could have set out the company’s terms of service ‘with more clarity,’ the allegations sufficiently informed Voyager of the basis for Meta’s claim.”
This battle began in January 2023 when Meta first filed the complaint. Now it can move forward. How long before the languid wheels of justice turn out a final ruling? A long time we wager.
Cynthia Murrell, June 21, 2024
Palantir: Fear Is Good. Fear Sells.
June 18, 2024
President Eisenhower may not have foreseen AI when he famously warned of the military-industrial complex, but certain software firms certainly fit the bill. One of the most successful, Palantir, is pursuing Madison Avenue type marketing with a message of alarm. The company’s co-founder, Alex Karp, is quoted in the fear-mongering post at right-wing Blaze Media, “U.S. Prepares for War Amid Growing Tensions that China Could Invade Taiwan.”
After several paragraphs of panic over tensions between China and Taiwan, writer Collin Jones briefly admits “It is uncertain if and when the Chinese president will deploy an attack against the small country.” He quickly pivots to the scary AI arms race, intimating Palantir and company can save us as long as we let (fund) them. The post concludes:
“Palantir’s CEO and co-founder Alex Karp said: ‘The way to prevent a war with China is to ramp up not just Palantir, but defense tech startups that produce software-defining weapons systems that scare the living F out of our adversaries.’ Karp noted that the U.S. must stay ahead of its military opponents in the realm of AI. ‘Our adversaries have a long tradition of being not interested in the rule of law, not interested in fairness, not interested in human rights and on the battlefield. It really is going to be us or them.’ Karp noted that the U.S. must stay ahead of its military opponents in the realm of AI. You do not want a world order where our adversaries try to define new norms. It would be very bad for the world, and it would be especially bad for America,’ Karp concluded.”
Wow. But do such scare tactics work? Of course they do. For instance, we learn from DefenseScoop, “Palantir Lands $480M Army Contract for Maven Artificial Intelligence Tech.” That article reports on not one but two Palantir deals: the titular Maven expansion and, we learn:
“The company was recently awarded another AI-related deal by the Army for the next phase of the service’s Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) ground station program, which aims to provide soldiers with next-generation data fusion and deep-sensing capabilities via artificial intelligence and other tools. That other transaction agreement was worth $178 million.”
Those are just two recent examples of Palantir’s lucrative government contracts, ones that have not, as of this writing, been added this running tally. It seems the firm has found its winning strategy. Ramping up tensions between world powers is a small price to pay for significant corporate profits, apparently.
Cynthia Murrell, June 18, 2024
Allegations of Personal Data Flows from X.com to Au10tix
June 4, 2024
This essay is the work of a dinobaby. Unlike some folks, no smart software improved my native ineptness.
I work from my dinobaby lair in rural Kentucky. What the heck to I know about Hod HaSharon, Israel? The answer is, “Not much.” However, I read an online article called “Elon Musk Now Requiring All X Users Who Get Paid to Send Their Personal ID Details to Israeli Intelligence-Linked Corporation.”I am not sure if the statements in the write up are accurate. I want to highlight some items from the write up because I have not seen information about this interesting identify verification process in my other feeds. This could be the second most covered news item in the last week or two. Number one goes to Google’s telling people to eat a rock a day and its weird “not our fault” explanation of its quantumly supreme technology.
Here’s what I carried away from this X to Au10tix write up. (A side note: Intel outfits like obscure names. In this case, Au10tix is a cute conversion of the word authentic to a unique string of characters. Aw ten tix. Get it?)
Yes, indeed. There is an outfit called Au10tix, and it is based about 60 miles north of Jerusalem, not in the intelware capital of the world Tel Aviv. The company, according to the cited write up, has a deal with Elon Musk’s X.com. The write up asserts:
X now requires new users who wish to monetize their accounts to verify their identification with a company known as Au10tix. While creator verification is not unusual for online platforms, Elon Musk’s latest move has drawn intense criticism because of Au10tix’s strong ties to Israeli intelligence. Even people who have no problem sharing their personal information with X need to be aware that the company they are using for verification is connected to the Israeli government. Au10tix was founded by members of the elite Israeli intelligence units Shin Bet and Unit 8200.
Sounds scary. But that’s the point of the article. I would like to remind you, gentle reader, that Israel’s vaunted intelligence systems failed as recently as October 2023. That event was described to me by one of the country’s former intelligence professionals as “our 9/11.” Well, maybe. I think it made clear that the intelware does not work as advertised in some situations. I don’t have first-hand information about Au10tix, but I would suggest some caution before engaging in flights of fancy.
The write up presents as actual factual information:
The executive director of the Israel-based Palestinian digital rights organization 7amleh, Nadim Nashif, told the Middle East Eye: “The concept of verifying user accounts is indeed essential in suppressing fake accounts and maintaining a trustworthy online environment. However, the approach chosen by X, in collaboration with the Israeli identity intelligence company Au10tix, raises significant concerns. “Au10tix is located in Israel and both have a well-documented history of military surveillance and intelligence gathering… this association raises questions about the potential implications for user privacy and data security.” Independent journalist Antony Loewenstein said he was worried that the verification process could normalize Israeli surveillance technology.
What the write up did not significant detail. The write up reports:
Au10tix has also created identity verification systems for border controls and airports and formed commercial partnerships with companies such as Uber, PayPal and Google.
My team’s research into online gaming found suggestions that the estimable 888 Holdings may have a relationship with Au10tix. The company pops up in some of our research into facial recognition verification. The Israeli gig work outfit Fiverr.com seems to be familiar with the technology as well. I want to point out that one of the Fiverr gig workers based in the UK reported to me that she was no longer “recognized” by the Fiverr.com system. Yeah, October 2023 style intelware.
Who operates the company? Heading back into my files, I spotted a few names. These individuals may no longer involved in the company, but several names remind me of individuals who have been active in the intelware game for a few years:
- Ron Atzmon: Chairman (Unit 8200 which was not on the ball on October 2023 it seems)
- Ilan Maytal: Chief Data Officer
- Omer Kamhi: Chief Information Security Officer
- Erez Hershkovitz: Chief Financial Officer (formerly of the very interesting intel-related outfit Voyager Labs, a company about which the Brennan Center has a tidy collection of information related to the LAPD)
The company’s technology is available in the Azure Marketplace. That description identifies three core functions of Au10tix’ systems:
- Identity verification. Allegedly the system has real-time identify verification. Hmm. I wonder why it took quite a bit of time to figure out who did what in October 2023. That question is probably unfair because it appears no patrols or systems “saw” what was taking place. But, I should not nit pick. The Azure service includes a “regulatory toolbox including disclaimer, parental consent, voice and video consent, and more.” That disclaimer seems helpful.
- Biometrics verification. Again, this is an interesting assertion. As imagery of the October 2023 emerged I asked myself, “How did that ID to selfie, selfie to selfie, and selfie to token matches” work? Answer: Ask the families of those killed.
- Data screening and monitoring. The system can “identify potential risks and negative news associated with individuals or entities.” That might be helpful in building automated profiles of individuals by companies licensing the technology. I wonder if this capability can be hooked to other Israeli spyware systems to provide a particularly helpful, real-time profile of a person of interest?
Let’s assume the write up is accurate and X.com is licensing the technology. X.com — according to “Au10tix Is an Israeli Company and Part of a Group Launched by Members of Israel’s Domestic Intelligence Agency, Shin Bet” — now includes this
The circled segment of the social media post says:
I agree to X and Au10tix using images of my ID and my selfie, including extracted biometric data to confirm my identity and for X’s related safety and security, fraud prevention, and payment purposes. Au10tix may store such data for up to 30 days. X may store full name, address, and hashes of my document ID number for as long as I participate in the Creator Subscription or Ads Revenue Share program.
This dinobaby followed the October 2023 event with shock and surprise. The dinobaby has long been a champion of Israel’s intelware capabilities, and I have done some small projects for firms which I am not authorized to identify. Now I am skeptical and more critical. What if X’s identity service is compromised? What if the servers are breached and the data exfiltrated? What if the system does not work and downstream financial fraud is enabled by X’s push beyond short text messaging? Much intelware is little more than glorified and old-fashioned search and retrieval.
Does Mr. Musk or other commercial purchasers of intelware know about cracks and fissures in intelware systems which allowed the October 2023 event to be undetected until live-fire reports arrived? This tie up is interesting and is worth monitoring.
Stephen E Arnold, June 4, 2024
NSO Group: Making Headlines Again and Again and Again
May 31, 2024
This essay is the work of a dinobaby. Unlike some folks, no smart software improved my native ineptness.
NSO Group continues to generate news. One example is the company’s flagship sponsorship of an interesting conference going on in Prague from June 4th to the 6th. What’s interesting mean? I think those who attend the conference are engaged in information-related activities connected in some way to law enforcement and intelligence. How do I know NSO Group ponied up big bucks to be the “lead sponsor”? Easy. I saw this advertisement on the conference organizer’s Web site. I know you want me to reveal the url, but I will treat the organizer in a professional manner. Just use those Google Dorks, and you will locate the event. The ad:
What’s the ad from the “lead sponsor” say? Here are a few snippets from the marketing arm of NSO Group:
NSO Group develops and provides state-of-the-art solutions, designed to assist in preventing terrorism and crime. Our solutions address diverse strategical, tactical and operational needs and scenarios to serve authorized government agencies including intelligence, military and law enforcement. Developed by the top technology and data science experts, the NSO portfolio includes cyber intelligence, network and homeland security solutions. NSO Group is proud to help to protect lives, security and personal safety of citizens around the world.
Innocent stuff with a flavor jargon-loving Madison Avenue types prefer.
Citizen’s Lab is a bit like mules in an old-fashioned grist mill. The researchers do not change what they think about. Source: Royal Mint Museum in the UK.
Just for some fun, let’s look at the NSO Group through a different lens. The UK newspaper The Guardian, which counts how many stories I look at a year, published “Critics of Putin and His Allies Targeted with Spyware Inside the EU.” Here’s a sample of the story’s view of NSO Group:
At least seven journalists and activists who have been vocal critics of the Kremlin and its allies have been targeted inside the EU by a state using Pegasus, the hacking spyware made by Israel’s NSO Group, according to a new report by security researchers. The targets of the hacking attempts – who were first alerted to the attempted cyber-intrusions after receiving threat notifications from Apple on their iPhones – include Russian, Belarusian, Latvian and Israeli journalists and activists inside the EU.
And who wrote the report?
Access Now, the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto (“the Citizen Lab”), and independent digital security expert Nikolai Kvantiliani
The Citizen Lab has been paying attention to NSO Group for years. The people surveilled or spied upon via the NSO Group’s Pegasus technology are anti-Russia; that is, none of the entities will be invited to a picnic at Mr. Putin’s estate near Sochi.
Obviously some outfit has access to the Pegasus software and its command-and-control system. It is unlikely that NSO Group provided the software free of charge. Therefore, one can conclude that NSO Group could reveal what country was using its software for purposes one might consider outside the bounds of the write up’s words cited above.
NSO Group remains one of the — if not the main — poster children for specialized software. The company continues to make headlines. Its technology remains one of the leaders in the type of software which can be used to obtain information for a mobile device. There are some alternatives, but NSO Group remains the Big Dog.
One wonders why Israel, presumably with the Pegasus tool, could not have obtained information relevant to the attack in October 2023. My personal view is that having Fancy Dan ways to get data from a mobile phone, human analysts have to figure out what’s important and what to identify as significant.
My point is that the hoo-hah about NSO Group and Pegasus may not be warranted. Information without the trained analysts and downstream software may have difficulty getting the information required to take a specific action. Israel’s lack of intelligence means that software alone can’t do the job. No matter what the marketing material says or how slick the slide deck used to brief those with a “need to know” appears — software is not intelligence.
Will NSO Group continue to make headlines? Probably. Those with access to Pegasus will make errors and disclose their ineptness. Citizen’s Lab will be at the ready. New reports will be forthcoming.
Net net: Is anyone surprised Mr. Putin is trying to monitor anti-Russia voices? Is Pegasus the only software pressed into service? My answer to this question is: “Mr. Putin will use whatever tool he can to achieve his objectives.” Perhaps Citizen’s Lab should look for other specialized software and expand its opportunities to write reports? When will Apple address the vulnerability which NSO Group continues to exploit?
Stephen E Arnold, May 31, 2024
A Look at Several Cyber Busts of 2023
May 8, 2024
Curious about cybercrime and punishment? Darknet data firm DarkOwl gives us a good run down of selective take downs in its blog post, “Cybercriminal Arrests and Disruptions: 2023 Look Back.” The post asserts law enforcement is getting more proactive about finding and disrupting hackers. (Whether that improvement is keeping pace with the growth of hacking is another matter.) We are given seven high-profile examples.
First was the FBI’s takedown of New York State’s Conor Fitzpatrick, admin of the dark web trading post BreachForums. Unfortunately, the site was back up and running in no time under Fitzpatrick’s partner. The FBI seems to have had more success disrupting the Hive Ransomware group, seizing assets and delivering decryption keys to victims. Europol similarly disrupted the Ragnar Locker Ransomware group and even arrested two key individuals. Then there were a couple of kids from the Lapsus$ Gang. Literally, these hackers were UK teenagers responsible for millions of dollars worth of damage and leaked data. See the write-up for more details on these and three other 2023 cases. The post concludes:
“Only some of the law enforcement action that took place in 2023 are described in this blog. Law enforcement are becoming more and more successful in their operations against cybercriminals both in terms of arrests and seizure of infrastructure – including on the dark web. However, events this year (2024) have already shown that some law enforcement action is not enough to take down groups, particularly ransomware groups. Notable activity against BlackCat/ALPHV and LockBit have shown to only take the groups out for a matter of days, when no arrests take place. BlackCat are reported to have recently conducted an exit scam after a high-profile ransomware was paid, and Lockbit seem intent on revenge after their recent skirmish with the law. It is unlikely that law enforcement will be able to eradicate cybercrime and the game whack-a-mole will continue. However, the events of 2023 show that the law enforcement bodies globally are taking action and standing up to the criminals creating dire consequences for some, which will hopefully deter future threat actors.”
One can hope.
Cynthia Murrell, May 8, 2024
Reflecting on the Value Loss from a Security Failure
May 6, 2024
This essay is the work of a dinobaby. Unlike some folks, no smart software improved my native ineptness.
Right after the October 2023 security lapse in Israel, I commented to one of the founders of a next-generation Israeli intelware developer, “Quite a security failure.” The response was, “It is Israel’s 9/11.” One of the questions that kept coming to my mind was, “How could such sophisticated intelligence systems, software, and personnel have dropped the ball?” I have arrived at an answer: Belief in the infallibility of in situ systems. Now I am thinking about the cost of a large-scale security lapse.
It seems the young workers are surprised the security systems did not work. Thanks, MSFT Copilot. Good enough which may be similar to some firms’ security engineering.
Globes published “Big Tech 50 Reveals Sharp Falls in Israeli Startup Valuations.” The write up provides some insight into the business cost of security which did not live up to its marketing. The write up says:
The Israeli R&D partnership has reported to the TASE [Tel Aviv Stock Exchange] that 10 of the 14 startups in which it has invested have seen their valuations decline.
Interesting.
What strikes me is that the cost of a security lapse is obviously personal and financial. One of the downstream consequences is a loss of confidence or credibility. Israel’s hardware and software security companies have had, in my opinion, a visible presence at conferences addressing specialized systems and software. The marketing of the capabilities of these systems has been maturing and becoming more like Madison Avenue efforts.
I am not sure which is worse: The loss of “value” or the loss of “credibility.”
If we transport the question about the cost of a security lapse to large US high-technology company, I am not sure a Globes’ type of article captures the impact. Frankly, US companies suffer security issues on a regular basis. Only a few make headlines. And then the firms responsible for the hardware or software which are vulnerable because of poor security issue a news release, provide a software update, and move on.
Several observations:
- The glittering generalities about the security of widely used hardware and software is simply out of step with reality
- Vendors of specialized software such as intelware suggest that their systems provide “protection” or “warnings” about issues so that damage is minimized. I am not sure I can trust these statements.
- The customers, who may have made security configuration errors, have the responsibility to set up the systems, update, and have trained personnel operate them. That sounds great, but it is simply not going to happen. Customers are assuming what they purchase is secure.
Net net: The cost of security failure is enormous: Loss of life, financial disaster, and undermining the trust between vendor and customer. Perhaps some large outfits should take the security of the products and services they offer beyond a meeting with a PR firm, a crisis management company, or a go-go marketing firm? The “value” of security is high, but it is much more than a flashy booth, glib presentations at conferences, or a procurement team assuming what vendors present correlates with real world deployment.
Stephen E Arnold, May 6, 2024
-
- Subscribe to Beyond Search
Feature archive
News archive
-
