HP Autonomy Dust Up: Details, Details
May 11, 2015
I read belatedly yet another analysis of the HP lawsuit against Autonomy. “Details of HP Lawsuit against Autonomy Executives” The write up reports that HP is taking “direct legal action against Lynch.” There is nothing like a personal legal action to keep the legal eagles circling in search of money.
The HP position is that Lynch (the founder of Autonomy) and Sushovan Hussain (former Autonomy CFO) overstated Autonomy’s growth and profits. My reaction is “Yeah, but didn’t you guys review the numbers before you wrote a check for $7 or $8 billion?”
Details, details.
The article states:
The acquisition has been seen as a disaster for HP since the tech giant was forced to write down $8.8 billion from the deal in 2012. The $5.1 billion legal claim is one of the largest ever brought against an individual in Britain. HP bases the claim on a $4.6 billion charge linked to the alleged financial misconduct, roughly $400 million connected to shares given to Lynch and Hussain and a further $100 million loss associated with Autonomy that was suspected of being caused by the former executives’ activities, according to the British court documents.
HP may not be a tech leader or even a C student in acquisition analyses, but it is the leader in the magnitude of the claim it is making against Dr. Lynch. If he is found guilty of selling something to HP who analyzed the deal and then decided to buy the company, he will have to pay $5.1 billion.
I don’t have a dog in this fight. But it seems to me that HP reviewed Qatalyst Partners’ financial presentation about Autonomy. Then HP analyzed the numbers. Then HP involved third parties in the review of the numbers. Then HP decided to buy Autonomy. Then HP bought the company. Then HP found that Autonomy is not exactly a product like a tube of Colgate Total toothpaste. Then HP fired, forced, or tasered Lynch and others out of the HP carpet land. Then HP tried to convert the technology into some sort of cloud based toolkit. And finally HP decided to go after Dr. Lynch. You don’t have to like him, but he is a bit of a celebrity in the Silicon Fen, holds an Order of the British Empire, and he is quite intelligent, maybe brilliant, and in my experience, not into dorks, fools, goof balls, losers, or dopey managers. Your mileage may vary, of course.
I am sufficiently experienced to know that when a buyer wants a product, service, or company, craving—nay, lust and craziness—kick in. “Yo, we’re 17 years old again. Let’s do it” scream the adrenaline charged experts. This is a slam dunk. We can take Autonomy waaaay beyond the place it is today. Rah, rah, rah. Get ‘em, team.”
Autonomy’s management and its advisors knows that PowerPoint dust can close deals. The blend of blood frenzy and the feeling of power one gets when taking ownership of a new La Ferrari is what business is about, dog. Smiles and PowerPointing from Autonomy played a part, but HP made the decision and wrote the check. Caveat emptor is good advice.
Frankly I see HP as the ideal candidate for a marvelous business school case. The HP Autonomy story is better than the Yahoo track record of blunders and blind luck. The management of HP believed something that has never ever ever been done: Generate billions of dollars in new revenue quickly. Google generates billions from advertising. Autonomy generated hundreds of millions in revenues from the licensing of dozens of products. HP got its wires crossed in reasoning which does not line up with the history of the search and content processing industry.
Billions do not flow from content processing and search technology. Investors can pump big money into a content processing company like Palantir. Will these investors get their money back? Don’t know. But to spend billions for a search and content processing company and then project that a $600 million or $800 million per year outfit would produce a gusher of billions is a big, but quite incorrect, thought.
Never has happened. Never will. It took Autonomy 15 years, good management, intelligent acquisitions, and lots of adaptation to hit the $600-$700 million plus in annual revenue it generated. Only energy drinking MBAs with Excel fever can convert 15 years and multiple revenue streams from dozens of quite different products into one giant multi billion dollar business in a couple of years. The scale is out of whack. When I visited the store in Manhattan with the big crazy pencil and the other giant products I could see the difference between my pencil and the big pencil. HP, I assume, would see the two pencils as identical. HP, if it purchased a big pencil, would sue the shop in Manhattan because the big pencil would not fit into a Panasonic desktop pencil sharpener. Scale of thinking, accuracy of perception—They matter to me. HP? Hmm.
This is not bad business on HP’s part. This is not flawed acquisition analysis on HP’s part. This is not HP’s inability to ask the right questions. This is medieval lunacy with managers dancing on the grass under a full moon. Isn’t HP that company which has floundered, investigated its own Board of Directors, chased good managers from one office in Silicon Valley into the arms of a competitor based on the old Sea World property? Maybe. Maybe HP is a fully stocked fishing pond, not a water deficient stream in Palo Alto?
My personal view is that HP has itself, its Board of Directors, and its advisors to blame. I find it very difficult to believe that as talented as Dr. Lynch is that he could spoof HP’s Board, HP’s financial professionals, HP’s advisors, HP’s lawyer, and HP’s Meg Whitman. Hey, the guy is talented, but he is not Houdini.
Well, we have a show, gentle reader. We have a really big show. Where is Ed Sullivan when we need an announcer?
Stephen E Arnold, May 11, 2015
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