Enterprise Search Revisionism: Can One Change What Happened
March 9, 2016
I read “The Search Continues: A History of Search’s Unsatisfactory Progress.” I noted some points which, in my opinion, underscore why enterprise search has been problematic and why the menagerie of experts and marketers have put search and retrieval on the path to enterprise irrelevance. The word that came to mind when I read the article was “revisionism” for the millennials among us.
The write up ignores the fact that enterprise search dates back to the early 1970s. One can argue that IBM’s Storage and Information Retrieval System (STAIRS) was the first significant enterprise search system. The point is that enterprise search as a productized service has a history of over promising and under delivering of more than 40 years.
Enterprise search with a touch of Stalinist revisionism.
Customers said they wanted to “find” information. What those individuals meant was have access to information that provided the relevant facts, documents, and data needed to deal with a problem.
Because providing on point information was and remains a very, very difficult problem, the vendors interpreted “find” to mean a list of indexed documents that contained the users’ search terms. But there was a problem. Users were not skilled in crafting queries which were essentially computer instructions between words the index actually contained.
After STAIRS came other systems, many other systems which have been documented reasonably well in Bourne and Bellardo-Hahn’s A History of Online information Services 1963-1976. (The period prior to 1970 describes for-fee research centric online systems. STAIRS was among the most well known early enterprise information retrieval system.) I provided some history in the first three editions of the Enterprise Search Report, published from 2003 to 2007. I have continued to document enterprise search in the Xenky profiles and in this blog.
The history makes painful reading for those who invested in many search and retrieval companies and for the executives who experienced the crushing of their dreams and sometimes career under the buzz saw of reality.
In a nutshell, enterprise search vendors heard what prospects, workers overwhelmed with digital and print information, and unhappy users of those early systems were saying.
The disconnect was that enterprise search vendors parroted back marketing pitches that assured enterprise procurement teams of these functions:
- Easy to use
- “All” information instantly available
- Answers to business questions
- Faster decision making
- Access to the organization’s knowledge.
The result was a steady stream of enterprise search product launches. Some of these were funded by US government money like Verity. Sure, the company struggled with the cost of infrastructure the Verity system required. The work arounds were okay as long as the infrastructure could keep pace with the new and changed word-centric documents. Toss in other types of digital information, make the system perform ever faster indexing, and keep the Verity system responding quickly was another kettle of fish.
Research oriented information retrieval experts looked at the Verity type system and concluded, “We can do more. We can use better algorithms. We can use smart software to eliminate some of the costs and indexing delays. We can [ fill in the blank ].
The cycle of describing what an enterprise search system could actually deliver was disconnected from the promises the vendors made. As one moves through the decades from 1973 to the present, the failures of search vendors made it clear that:
- Companies and government agencies would buy a system, discover it did not do the job users needed, and buy another system.
- New search vendors picked up the methods taught at Cornell, Stanford, and other search-centric research centers and wrap on additional functions like semantics. The core of most modern enterprise search systems is unchanged from what STAIRS implemented.
- Search vendors came like Convera, failed, and went away. Some hit revenue ceilings and sold to larger companies looking for a search utility. The acquisitions hit a high water mark with the sale of Autonomy (a 1990s system) to HP for $11 billion.
What about Oracle, as a representative outfit. Oracle database has included search as a core system function since the day Larry Ellison envisioned becoming a big dog in enterprise software. The search language was Oracle’s version of the structured query language. But people found that difficult to use. Oracle purchased Artificial Linguistics in order to make finding information more intuitive. Oracle continued to try to crack the find information problem through the acquisitions of Triple Hop, its in-house Secure Enterprise Search, and some other odds and ends until it bought in rapid succession InQuira (a company formed from the failure of two search vendors), RightNow (technology from a Dutch outfit RightNow acquired), and Endeca. Where is search at Oracle today? Essentially search is a utility and it is available in Oracle applications: customer support, ecommerce, and business intelligence. In short, search has shifted from the “solution” to a component used to get started with an application that allows the user to find the answer to business questions.
I mention the Oracle story because it illustrates the consistent pattern of companies which are actually trying to deliver information that the u9ser of a search system needs to answer a business or technical question.
I don’t want to highlight the inaccuracies of “The Search Continues.” Instead I want to point out the problem buzzwords create when trying to understand why search has consistently been a problem and why today’s most promising solutions may relegate search to a permanent role of necessary evil.
In the write up, the notion of answering questions, analytics, federation (that is, running a single query across multiple collections of content and file types), the cloud, and system performance are the conclusion of the write up.
Wrong.
The use of open source search systems means that good enough is the foundation of many modern systems. Palantir-type outfits, essential an enterprise search vendors describing themselves as “intelligence” providing systems,, uses open source technology in order to reduce costs, shift bug chasing to a community, The good enough core is wrapped with subsystems that deal with the pesky problems of video, audio, data streams from sensors or similar sources. Attivio, formed by professionals who worked at the infamous Fast Search & Transfer company, delivers active intelligence but uses open source to handle the STAIRS-type functions. These companies have figured out that open source search is a good foundation. Available resources can be invested in visualizations, generating reports instead of results lists, and graphical interfaces which involve the user in performing tasks smart software at this time cannot perform.
For a low cost enterprise search system, one can download Lucene, Solr, SphinxSearch, or any one of a number of open source systems. There are low cost (keep in mind that costs of search can be tricky to nail down) appliances from vendors like Maxxcat and Thunderstone. One can make do with the craziness of the search included with Microsoft SharePoint.
For a serious application, enterprises have many choices. Some of these are highly specialized like BAE NetReveal and Palantir Metropolitan. Others are more generic like the Elastic offering. Some are free like the Effective File Search system.
The point is that enterprise search is not what users wanted in the 1970s when IBM pitched the mainframe centric STAIRS system, in the 1980s when Verity pitched its system, in the 1990s when Excalibur (later Convera) sold its system, in the 2000s when Fast Search shifted from Web search to enterprise search and put the company on the road to improper financial behavior, and in the efflorescence of search sell offs (Dassault bought Exalead, IBM bought iPhrase and other search vendors), and Lexmark bought Brainware and ISYS Search Software.
Where are we today?
Users still want on point information. The solutions on offer today are application and use case centric, not the silly one-size-fits-all approach of the period from 2001 to 2011 when Autonomy sold to HP.
Open source search has helped create an opportunity for vendors to deliver information access in interesting ways. There are cloud solutions. There are open source solutions. There are small company solutions. There are more ways to find information than at any other time in the history of search as I know it.
Unfortunately, the same problems remain. These are:
- As the volume of digital information goes up, so does the cost of indexing and accessing the sources in the corpus
- Multimedia remains a significant challenge for which there is no particularly good solution
- Federation of content requires considerable investment in data grooming and normalizing
- Multi-lingual corpuses require humans to deal with certain synonyms and entity names
- Graphical interfaces still are stupid and need more intelligence behind the icons and links
- Visualizations have to be “accurate” because a bad decision can have significant real world consequences
- Intelligent systems are creeping forward but crazy Watson-like marketing raises expectations and exacerbates the credibility of enterprise search’s capabilities.
I am okay with history. I am not okay with analyses that ignore some very real and painful lessons. I sure would like some of the experts today to know a bit more about the facts behind the implosions of Convera, Delphis, Entopia, and many other companies.
I also would like investors in search start ups to know a bit more about the risks associated with search and content processing.
In short, for a history of search, one needs more than 900 words mixing up what happened with what is.
Stephen E Arnold, March 9, 2016
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