Microsoft: Technical Excellence Translates to More Excellencerness
February 18, 2021
I found the Microsoft explanation of the SolarWinds’ misstep interesting. CBS circulated some of the information in the interview in “SolarWinds: How Russian Spies Hacked the Justice, State, Treasury, Energy and Commerce Departments.” The point that Windows’ security systems did not detect the spoofing, modifying, and running of Microsoft software was skipped over in my opinion. I loved this statement by Brad Smith, one of the senior executives at the Redmond giant:
When we analyzed everything that we saw at Microsoft, we asked ourselves how many engineers have probably worked on these attacks. And the answer we came to was, well, certainly more than 1,000.
Then failing to detect the breach which seems to have exploited the fascinating Microsoft software update methods:
I think that when you look at the sophistication of this attacker there’s an asymmetric advantage for somebody playing offense.
Okay, “certainly.” Okay, 1,000.
What if SolarWinds’ misstep was not the largest and most sophisticated hack? Is it possible that an insider or a contractor working from home in another country provided the credentials? What if piggybacking on the wild and wonderful Windows’ update system and method was a cottage industry among some bad actors? What if the idea for the malware was a result of carelessness and assumptions about the “security” of how Microsoft and its partners conducted routine business? What if the bad actors used open source software and some commercial reverse engineering tools, information on hacker forums, and trial and error? Does one need a 1,000 engineers? Microsoft may need that many engineers, but in my experience gained in rural Kentucky, a handful of clever individuals could have made the solar fires burn more brightly. Who can manage 1,000 hackers? I am not sure nation states can get 1,000 cyber warriors to a single conference center at one time or get most to read their email, file reports, and coordinate their code. Some may suggest Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran can do these managerial things in a successful way. Not I. The simplest explanation is often the correct one. Insider, opportunism, and a small team makes more sense to me.
Let me shift gears.
What about the spoofing, modifying, and running of Microsoft software for months, maybe a year, maybe more without detecting the intrusion?
I noted “A Vulnerability in Windows Defender Went Unnoticed for 12 Years.” That write up asserts:
A critical bug in Windows Defender went undetected by both attackers and defenders for some 12 years, before finally being patched last fall. The vulnerability in Microsoft’s built-in antivirus software could have allowed hackers to overwrite files or execute malicious code—if the bug had been found. Let’s be clear—12 years is a long time when it comes to the life cycle of a mainstream operating system, and it’s a heck of a long time for such a critical vulnerability to hide.
Sure, let’s be clear. Microsoft talks security. It issues techno-marketing posts like its late January explanation of the SolarWinds’ misstep which I reported on in the DarkCyber video news program on February 9, 2021.
But perhaps more pointed questions should be asked. I don’t want to know about Team featuritis. I don’t want to know why I should not install certain Windows 10 updates or accept updates like the mandatory update KB4023057. I don’t want to know about folding mobile phones. Nope. None of those things.
I want TV interviewers, CBS “real news” writers, and Microsoft to move beyond marketing chatter, hollow assurances, and techno-babble. Oh, I forgot. The election, Covid, and the Azure cloud JEDI thing. I, like others, need their priorities readjusted.
How many employees and partners told Brad Smith, “You were great in the 60 Minutes interview? Lots I would wager.
Stephen E Arnold, February 18, 2021
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