February 22, 2017
What is known as the Dark Web has a fair amount of myth surrounding it, thanks to a sensationalized name and a few high-profile media stories. Tech Republic shared an article called, Four misleading myths about the Dark Web, attempting to shine light on some of the common fallacies. In summary, the Dark Web is not necessarily anonymous, it’s not very difficult to access, it’s not all nefarious activity, and there is support for businesses and organizations seeking protection from and prevention of cybertheft and security breaches. The article explains,
The biggest mistake businesses large and small can make regarding the Dark Web is to pretend it doesn’t exist. After the FBI took down the Silk Road, dozens of other niche markets took its place. With a slick interface and well organized ecommerce-like storefront, AlphaBay, one of the largest black markets on the Dark Web, makes shopping for stolen credit card data a breeze. Fortunately for companies, there’s no need to track the Dark Web alone. One technology in particular, Matchlight by Terbium Labs, helps business monitor and locate stolen Dark Web data like stolen source code, employee social security numbers, and other proprietary trade documents.
The Dark Web has become almost synonymous with Tor, the seemingly most popular way to access it. Tor has actually been used since the 1990’s by members of the intelligence community; it was developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory. While over the last decade or so, Tor has been surrounded by media coverage about drugs and crime, it will be interesting to see if the coverage shifts — or increases — because of emerging technologies such as Matchlight.
Megan Feil, February 22, 2017
February 7, 2017
Some articles about the Dark Web are erring on the side of humor about it’s threat-factor. Metro UK published 12 scary things which happen when you go on the ‘Dark Web’, which points out some less commonly reported happenings on the Dark Web. Amongst the sightings mentioned were: a German man selling pretzels, someone with a 10/10 rating at his carrot (the actual vegetable) marketplace, and a template for creating counterfeit Gucci designs. The article reports,
Reddit users shared their stories about the ‘dark web’ – specifically Tor sites, invisible to normal browsers, and notorious for hosting drug markets and child pornography. Using the free Tor browser, you can access special .onion sites – only accessible using the browser – many of which openly host highly illegal content including pirated music and films, drugs, child pornography and sites where credit card details are bought and sold.
While we chose not to summarize several of the more dark happenings mentioned by Redditors, we know the media has given enough of that side to let your imaginations run wild. Of course, as has also been reported by more serious publications, it is a myth that the Dark Web is only filled with cybercriminals. Unless pretzels have qualities that have yet to be understood as malicious.
Megan Feil, February 7, 2017
February 3, 2017
The article on AP titled Browse Free or Die? New Hampshire Library Is at Privacy Fore relates the ongoing battle between The Kilton Public Library of Lebanon, New Hampshire and Homeland Security. This fierce little library was the first in the nation to use Tor, the location and identity scrambling software with a seriously bad rap. It is true, Tor can be used by criminals, and has been used by terrorists. As this battle unfolds in the USA, France is also scrutinizing Tor. But for librarians, the case is simple,
Tor can protect shoppers, victims of domestic violence, whistleblowers, dissidents, undercover agents — and criminals — alike. A recent routine internet search using Tor on one of Kilton’s computers was routed through Ukraine, Germany and the Netherlands. “Libraries are bastions of freedom,” said Shari Steele, executive director of the Tor Project, a nonprofit started in 2004 to promote the use of Tor worldwide. “They are a great natural ally.”… “Kilton’s really committed as a library to the values of intellectual privacy.
To illustrate a history of action by libraries on behalf of patron privacy, the article briefly lists events surrounding the Cold War, the Patriot Act, and the Edward Snowden leak. It is difficult to argue with librarians. For many of us, they were amongst the first authority figures, they are extremely well read, and they are clearly arguing passionately about an issue that few people fully understand. One of the library patrons spoke about how he is comforted by the ability to use Tor for innocent research that might get him flagged by the NSA all the same. Libraries might become the haven of democracy in what has increasingly become a state of constant surveillance. One argument might go along these lines: if we let Homeland Security take over the Internet and give up intellectual freedom, don’t the terrorists win anyway?
Chelsea Kerwin, February 3, 2017
January 13, 2017
The Dark Web continues to be under the microscope. Sophos’ blog, Naked Security, published an article, The Dark Web: Just How Dark Is It? questioning the supposed “dark” motivations of its actors. This piece also attempts to bust myths about the complete anonymity of Tor. There is an entry guard, which knows who the user is, and an exit node, which knows the user’s history and neither of these are easy to avoid. Despite pointing out holes in the much-believed argument full anonymity always exists on Tor, the author makes an effort to showcase “real-world” scenarios for why their average readers may benefit from using Tor:
If you think a web site is legitimate, but you’re not completely sure and would like to “try before you buy,” why not take an incognito look first, shielding your name, your IP number, even your country? If you’re investigating a website that you think has ripped off your intellectual property, why advertise who you are? If you want to know more about unexceptionable topics that it would nevertheless be best to keep private, such as medical issues, lifestyle choices or a new job, why shouldn’t you keep your identity to yourself? Similarly, if you want to offer online services to help people with those very issues, you’d like them to feel confident that you’ll do your best to uphold their privacy and anonymity.
We’re not convinced — but perhaps that is because the article put its foot in its mouth. First, they tell us Tor does not provide full anonymity and then the author attempts to advocate readers use Tor for anonymity. Which is it? More investigation under a different lens may be needed.
Kenny Toth, January 13, 2017
January 12, 2017
An article on Security Affairs called Boffins spotted over 100 snooping Tor HSDir nodes spying on Dark Web sites points to a new tactic that could be useful to companies offering Dark Web intelligence services. Within the inner workings of the Dark Web live at least 100, according to researchers, malicious hidden service directories (HSDirs). These are the relays of the network that allow people to visit hidden services. The author quotes researchers Filippo Valsorda and George Tankersley who presented at the Hack in the Box Security Conference,
When a person wants to host a hidden service, they have to advertise their service on a Tor Onion database, which is a DHT made up of a group of stable relay machines called HSDirs . The person who wants to visit the hidden service has to request information about that service from the database. Therefore, those relays or HSDirs can see who is making the request for a connection and when you want to connect. Therefore, to deanonymize a user’s traffic, an attacker could choose to become the HSDir nodes for the hidden service.
Additionally, researchers from Karlstad University in Sweden found 25 nodes within the The Onion Router (Tor) which showed entities snooping on the supposedly anonymous network. It appears gaps exist. The research shows an unspecified actor from Russia was eavesdropping. Are these snoopers Dark Web intelligence or cybercriminals? We shall stay tuned.
Megan Feil, January 12, 2017
January 5, 2017
The Tor Project has released the Alpha version of Tor Browser exclusive to Linux that users can test and use in sandboxed mode.
Sandboxing is a security mechanism employed to separate running processes. In computer security, sandboxing an application means separating its process from the OS, so vulnerabilities in that app can’t be leveraged to extend access to the underlying operating system.
As the browser that’s still under development is open to vulnerabilities, these loopholes can be used by competent parties to track down individuals. Sandboxing eliminates this possibility completely. The article further states that:
In recent years, Tor exploits have been deployed in order to identify and catch crooks hiding their identity using Tor. The Tor Project knows that these types of exploits can be used for other actions besides catching pedophiles and drug dealers. An exploit that unmasks Tor users can be very easily used to identify political dissidents or journalists investigating cases of corrupt politicians.
The Tor Project has been trying earnestly to close these loopholes and this seems to be one of their efforts to help netizens stay safe from prying eyes. But again, no system is full-proof. As soon as the new version is released, another exploit might follow suit.
Vishal Ingole, January 5, 2017
January 4, 2017
For all the effort enterprises go to in securing data through technological solutions, there are also other variables to consider: employees. Ars Technica released an article, Malicious computers caught snooping on Tor-anonymized Dark Web sites, which explained malicious relays were found on over 110 machines around the world. Computer scientists at Northeastern University tracked these computers using honeypot.onion addresses, calling them “honions.” The article continues,
The research is only the latest indication that Tor can’t automatically guarantee the anonymity of hidden services or the people visiting them. Last year, FBI agents cracked open a Tor-hidden child pornography website using a technique that remains undisclosed to this day. In 2014, researchers canceled a security conference talk demonstrating a low-cost way to de-anonymize Tor users following requests by attorneys from Carnegie Mellon, where the researchers were employed. Tor developers have since fixed the weakness that made the exploit possible. More than 70 percent of the snooping hidden services directories were hosted on cloud services, making it hard for most outsiders to identify the operators.
While some may wonder if the snooping is a result of a technical glitch or other error, the article suggests this is not the case. Researchers found that in order for a directory to misbehave in this way, an operator has to change the code from Tor and add logging capabilities. It appears the impact this will have is yet to be fully revealed.
Megan Feil, January 4, 2017
January 1, 2017
An article at Naked Security reveals some information turned up by innovative Tor-exploring hidden services in its article, “‘Honey Onions’ Probe the Dark Web: At Least 3% of Tor Nodes are Rogues.” By “rogues,” writer Paul Ducklin is referring to sites, run by criminals and law-enforcement alike, that are able to track users through Tor entry and/or exit nodes. The article nicely lays out how this small fraction of sites can capture IP addresses, so see the article for that explanation. As Ducklin notes, three percent is a small enough window that someone just wishing to avoid having their shopping research tracked may remain unconcerned, but is a bigger matter for, say, a journalist investigating events in a war-torn nation. He writes:
Two researchers from Northeastern University in Boston, Massachussets, recently tried to measure just how many rogue HSDir nodes there might be, out of the 3000 or more scattered around the world. Detecting that there are rogue nodes is fairly easy: publish a hidden service, tell no one about it except a minimum set of HSDir nodes, and wait for web requests to come in.[…]
With 1500 specially-created hidden services, amusingly called ‘Honey Onions,’ or just Honions, deployed over about two months, the researchers measured 40,000 requests that they assume came from one or more rogue nodes. (Only HSDir nodes ever knew the name of each Honion, so the researchers could assume that all connections must have been initiated by a rogue node.) Thanks to some clever mathematics about who knew what about which Honions at what time, they calculated that these rogue requests came from at least 110 different HSDir nodes in the Tor network.
It is worth noting that many of those requests were simple pings, but others were actively seeking vulnerabilities. So, if you are doing anything more sensitive than comparing furniture prices, you’ll have to decide whether you want to take that three percent risk. Ducklin concludes by recommending added security measures for anyone concerned.
Cynthia Murrell, January 1, 2017