Yep, Those Microsoft Exchange Servers Are Appealing to Some Bad Actors
February 22, 2022
I know that few agree with my assessment of Windows 11; that is, rushed out without informing the Twit.tv experts. Why? To get attention focused on something other than Microsoft security issues. SolarWinds? Exchange Server? I don’t know.
Then I irritated a few folks with my opinion that the big deal for the electronic game company and the attendant meta chant is essentially another distraction? Why? Maybe the wonderful Windows Defender system before an issue was fixed recently? Maybe another problem with Azure? I don’t know.
I do know that I read some information, which if true, makes clear that the US has a problem with security. And I know that some of the “problem” is a result of Microsoft’s software and systems. My source is the “real” news article FBI Says BlackByte Ransomware “FBI Says BlackByte Ransomware Group Has Breached Critical US Infrastructure.” Let’s assume that the information in the write up is mostly on the money.
First, we note that the FBI issued a statement available here which says that malware has compromised multiple businesses. What’s interesting is that infrastructure sectors appear to have been compromised. What does that mean? My take is that this is a gentle way of saying that bad actors can muck up certain organizations, financial functions, and food (maybe jiggle the chemicals for fertilizer or send box cars to Texas?).
Second, the write up points out that an NFL football team’s systems may have been fiddled. Interesting indeed. Why? No idea.
Third, this paragraph is the one which I think is the most important:
In their warning, the authorities said some victims reported that the bad actors used a known Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability to gain access to their networks. The authorities have also released filenames, indicators of compromise and hashes that IT personnel can use to check their networks for presence of the ransomware.
Yep, Microsoft. Exchange Servers.
Windows 11 distracted for a while. The game deal is headed for legal choppy water. What will Microsofties roll out next? A phone, a new foldable perhaps, another reorganization?
Fascinating that security issues keep emerging and with each revelation the stakes creep higher. Bad actors may find this information encouraging. I find it downright awful.
Stephen E Arnold, February 22, 2022
Department of Defense: Troubling News about Security
February 21, 2022
It looks like a lack of resources and opaque commercial cloud providers are two factors hampering the DOD’s efforts to keep the nation cyber-safe. Breaking Defense discusses recent research from the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in, “Pentagon’s Cybersecurity Tests Aren’t Realistic, Tough Enough: Report.” We encourage anyone interested in this important topic to check out the article and/or the report itself. Reporter Jaspreet Gill summarizes:
“[The report] states DoD should refocus its cybersecurity efforts on its cyber defender personnel instead of focusing primarily on the technology associated with cyber tools, networks and systems, and train them to face off against more real threats earlier in the process. For now, cybersecurity ‘Red Teams’ are stretched too thin and the ones that do test military systems are doing it with one hand tied behind their back compared to what actual adversaries would do, the report said.”
Enabling these teams to do their best work would mean giving them more time on the network to test vulnerabilities, more extensive toolsets, realistic rules of engagement, and better end-to-end planning, the report explains. In addition, it states, cyber security training must be expanded to include mission defense teams, system users, response-action teams, commanders, and network operators. We also learn that current funding practices effectively prohibit setting up offices dedicated to cyber technology effectiveness and training. Seriously? See the write-up for more recommendations that should be obvious.
The following bit is particularly troubling in this age of increasing privatization and corporate power. Gill informs us:
“The assessment also found DoD’s cyber concerns increasingly mirror those in the commercial sector due to increasing reliance on commercial products and infrastructure, especially with cloud services. The report recommends the Pentagon renegotiate contracts with commercial cloud providers and establish requirements for future contracts. ‘The DOD increasingly uses commercial cloud services to store highly sensitive, classified data, but current contracts with cloud vendors do not allow the DOD to independently assess the security of cloud infrastructure owned by the commercial vendor, preventing the DOD from fully assessing the security of commercial clouds. Current and future contracts must provide for threat-realistic, independent security assessments by the DOD of commercial clouds, to ensure critical data is protected.’”
Well yes—again that seems obvious. Public-private partnerships should be enacted with a dash of common sense. Unfortunately, that can be difficult to come by amidst bureaucracy.
Cynthia Murrell, February 21, 2022
NordVPN: Mostly Ironclad Privacy
February 3, 2022
Panama-based VPN provider NordVPN swore in 2017 that it would refuse requests from any foreign government to release customer data. In the wake of what happened to VPNLab after its tussle with Europol, however, TechRadar Pro reports, “NordVPN Will Now Comply with Law Enforcement Data Requests.” The firm still promises privacy—unless and until the legal eagles appear. We learn NordVPN recently revised the original, 2017 blog post in which it promised unwavering privacy to reflect the new reality. Reporter Anthony Spadafora writes:
“Now though, the original blog post has been edited and the post now reads: ‘NordVPN operates under the jurisdiction of Panama and will only comply with requests from foreign governments and law enforcement agencies if these requests are delivered according to laws and regulations.’ [Emphasis mine.] The revised blog post also goes a bit further in regard to NordVPN’s zero-logs policy by explaining that the company will log a user’s VPN activity if there is a court order to do so: ‘We are 100% committed to our zero-logs policy – to ensure users’ ultimate privacy and security, we never log their activity unless ordered by a court in an appropriate, legal way.’ Meanwhile, the company updated its privacy policy back in July of last year with a new section that contains further details on information requests. A NordVPN spokesperson explained in an email to TechRadar Pro that the sole reason it changed its blog post in the first place was to dissociate its company from bad actors following PCMag’s original article on the matter.”
Spadafora points out the now shuttered VPNLab mostly catered to cybercriminals—a very different outfit from NordVPN. He also emphasizes that, despite the new language, NordVPN still offers a no-logs VPN, so there would be little to no pre-existing data for the company to relinquish even if law enforcement did come knocking. At this point, such a request is purely hypothetical—the firm notes it has yet to receive a single national security letter, gag order, or warrant from government organizations asking for user information since it was founded in 2012. We suspect they hope that streak continues.
Cynthia Murrell, February 2, 2022
Google Docs: Exploit or Exploited?
February 2, 2022
Real-time collaboration has been a boon for teams working remotely over the last couple of years. For Google Docs, however, the feature has opened the door to a hazardous vulnerability. Security Boulevard reports on a “‘Massive Wave’ of Hackers Exploiting Comments in Google Docs.” Writer Teri Robinson tells us:
“It seems like users are now paying the price for Google not fully closing or mitigating a vulnerability in the comment feature of Google Docs—since December a ‘massive wave’ of hackers have exploited the flaw through impersonation and phishing to send malicious content to those using email—primarily Outlook—and Google Docs, according to researchers at Avanan. The targets? Just about any end user. Taking advantage of the ‘seamless nature’ of Google Docs that lets employees collaborate in real-time around the globe, the hackers simply add a comment to a Google Doc that mentions the target with an @. ‘By doing so, an email is automatically sent to that person’s inbox. In that email, which comes from Google, the full comment, including the bad links and text, is included,’ Avanan researchers wrote in a blog post. ‘Further, the email address isn’t shown, just the attackers’ name, making this ripe for impersonators.’ Avanan observed the hackers hitting more than ‘500 inboxes across 30 tenants … using over 100 different Gmail accounts.’”
The hackers’ efforts were helped by the fact their content was delivered directly by Google, which raises flags for neither most users nor their junk filters. That senders’ email addresses are hidden makes it that much harder to spot imposters. (Though, it should be noted, even if an address checks out it could be coming from a compromised account.) As many of our readers know, it just takes one worker falling for the trick to compromise an entire organization. Avanan researchers advise us not to reflexively trust messages just because they come through a trusted platform. Be sure to hover over links before clicking to confirm they will send you to an expected destination. And, as Robinson concludes:
“If users are unsure that a sender is on the up-and-up, they should contact the legitimate sender for confirmation that they sent a document, Avanan said.”
Yep, Google Docs, now mostly for fee thrills.
Cynthia Murrell, February 2, 2022
Microsoft Defender: Are There Other Winners?
February 1, 2022
I believe everything I read on the Internet, of course. One of the fascinating aspects of being old and doing the 21st century equivalent of clipping coupons is coming across “real” research studies. I read “Still Think Microsoft Defender Is Bad? Think Again, Says AV-TEST.”
The write up in Make Use Of Dot Com believes in Windows Defender. It article states:
A recent report by AV-TEST revealed that not only does Microsoft Defender perform well, it actually outperforms many highly-recommended antiviruses
The article included a link to the AV-Test December 2021 Report, and I downloaded it. The AV Test outfit is “the independent IT security institute.” The investment firm Triton owns Swiss IT Security, which is the outfit which “owns” AV-Test.
What does Swiss IT Security Group AG do? Security, consulting, the cloud, and related services.
What does the SITS Group care about Microsoft and its assorted products? With Microsoft’s wide use in organizations, SITS Group probably has an above average keenness for the Redmond wizards’ constructs.
What does this mean for the victory of the Windows Defender system in the AV-TEST Report? For me, I formulated several hypotheses:
- Windows Defender is now able to deal with the assorted threats directed at Microsoft operating systems? Rest easy. Malware popping up on a Windows device is obviously something that is unlikely to occur. Thank goodness.
- Cheerleading for Windows Defender probably makes Microsoft’s security team feel warm and fuzzy which will allow their efforts to deal with Exchange Server issues a more pleasant experience.
- Bad actors will have to rethink how to compromise organizations with Microsoft software. Perhaps some of these individuals will give up criminal activity and join the Red Cross or its equivalent.
For me, institutes which do not reveal their ownership are interesting outfits. But how many antivirus vendors achieved the lofty rank of Windows Defender, according to the report dated December 2021? Here they are:
Avira
Bull Guard
ESET
F Secure
Kaspersky
McAfee
Norton 360
Total Security
Viper.
Windows Defender makes 10 “winners.”
Now of these 10 which is the one that will make SolarWinds, ransomware, compromised Outlook emails, and Azure Cosmos excitement a thing of the past? Another question: “Which of these sort of work in the real world?” And, “If there is a best, why do we need the nine others?”
These are questions one can ask Triton / Swiss IT Security Group AG / AV Test to answer?
Net net: Marketing.
Stephen E Arnold, February 1, 2022
Insider Threats: Still a Useful Mechanism for Bad Actors
January 27, 2022
I read “Ransomware Gangs Increase Efforts to Enlist Insiders for Attacks.” I am not down with the notion of “increase efforts.” Identifying individuals who will provide user names, passwords, or facile fingers to slip a malware loaded USB key into a computer connected to an organization’s network has been a go-to method for a long, long time.
The write up states:
The survey was conducted by Hitachi ID, which performed a similar study in November 2021. Compared to the previous survey, there has been a 17% rise in the number of employees offered money to aid in ransomware attacks against their employer. Most specifically, 65% of the survey respondents say that they or their employees were approached between December 7, 2021, and January 4, 2022, to help hackers establish initial access.
The factoid in the magic-with-statistics write up is that a lot of individuals report brushes with the insider ploy. What’s important to remember, an insider can come from several different pools of people:
- There are disaffected employees who can be identified and then interviewed for a bogus news service or for a consulting job. A skilled contact working with an annoyed employee can often extract what might be termed a mother lode of useful information, including details about security, access, and other disaffected employees who want to put it to the “man” or “woman” who ruined a perfectly good morning of reading online news.
- Clueless former employees who respond to a LinkedIn-type job posting or an engaging individual in what sure looks like a chance encounter. Some individuals need or love money, and the engaging individual can buy or solicit security information from the CFE (clueless former employee).
- Happy current employees who find themselves confronted with a person who has information about a past indiscretion memorialized on Instagram, Meta, or TikTok. Maybe the current happy employee has forgotten text and images sent to an individual with some interesting preferences or behaviors. Blackmail? Well, more like leveraging TikTok-type data to identify and screen potential targets.
- Contractors — those faceless, often nameless — individuals who have to eat in their cube, not the two-star real employee cafeteria. Contractors can be hired and one can interact with these professionals. It is possible that these individuals can provide the keys to the kingdom so to speak without knowing the treasures unlocked with what seems to be casual conversation.
- Children of employees can be asked to give mom or dad a USB. The unwitting employee slams the key into the slot unaware that it has been weaponized. Who asks kids? A skilled operative can present herself as a colleague at the front door, explain this was your mom or dad’s memory stick, and ask the young person to hand it over to the parent. (If this method works, bingo. If it fails, another approach can be made. Wearing Covid masks and dressing in normcore gray with a worn ball cap can help too.)
Why am I identifying pools of insiders? Most of the cyber security firms do not have systems which cover these points of insider vulnerability. Do some of the firms purport to have these bases covered?
Of course.
That’s the point. The customer won’t know until it is too late. Predictive analytics and cyber threat intelligence struggle in certain situations. Insiders is one such example.
Stephen E Arnold, January 27, 2022
Excited about Microsoft and Games? What about Other Issues? Like, Uh, Security?
January 25, 2022
We learn of a recent complaint against SolarWinds from GitHub contributor jaybobo, who helpfully shares both the full filing and key highlights. The case was filed in Delaware’s Court of Chancery by shareholders, including the Construction Industry Laborers Pension Fund and the Central Laborers’ Pension Fund. In light of the Sunburst hack, the plaintiffs assert the company failed to appropriately secure their investments against cybersecurity risks. The complaint alleges:
“SolarWinds: (i) used weak passwords for its software download webpages such as ‘solarwinds123;’ (ii) did not properly segment its IT network; (iii) directed its clients to disable antivirus scanning and firewall protection on its Orion software; (iv) cut investments in cybersecurity; and (v) listed its sensitive and high-value clients on its webpage for anyone to see.”
Oof—these are indeed the opposite of security best practices. The parties insist this alleged negligence allowed the Sunburst attack to succeed, tanking their investments. The filing describes the impact:
“In the days following the Company’s initial public disclosure of SUNBURST in December 2020, SolarWinds’ stock lost nearly 40% of its value. As of today, the stock trades at more than a 30% discount to its pre-revelation trading price. For the six months ended June 30, 2021, the Company incurred $34 million in direct expenses related to SUNBURST, stemming from, inter alia, costs to investigate and remediate the cyber attack; legal, consulting, and other professional service expenses; and public relations costs. In the first six months ended June 30, 2021, the Company also experienced a 27% decline in its license revenue relative to the previous year. SolarWinds explained that this decline was ‘primarily due to decreased sales of our licensed products as a result of the Cyber Incident [i.e., SUNBURST]’ (among other factors). The Company’s net increase in cash and cash equivalents for the same period was down over 74% relative to the previous year, which the Company also attributed, in part, to SUNBURST.”
The plaintiffs go on to note several ongoing investigations and lawsuits now facing SolarWinds as a result of the debacle. Then there are the related insurance rate hikes, finance charges, and compliance activities. They estimate these factors add another $20 million a year in expenses that will also diminish their investments. The filing requests several measures from the court, like requiring the company to implement better security and, of course, awarding damages.
We want to point out the information in “Microsoft Discovers Undisclosed Bug in SolarWinds Server.” That write up which we spotted on January 22, 2022 (a Saturday by the way) states:
During the sustained monitoring of threats taking advantage of the ‘Log4j2’ vulnerabilities, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre (MSTIC) team observed activity related to attacks being propagated via a previously undisclosed vulnerability in the SolarWinds ‘Serv-U’ software. “We discovered that the vulnerability is an input validation vulnerability that could allow attackers to build a query given some input and send that query over the network without sanitation,” Microsoft said in its security update. SolarWinds said the Serv-U web login screen to LDAP authentication was allowing characters that were not sufficiently sanitized.
Worth monitoring security, but the metaverse more zippy.
Cynthia Murrell, January 25, 2021
How about Chinese Infiltration: Subtle Sometimes?
January 19, 2022
I read “MI5 Warning about Influence Efforts of British Chinese Lawyer Marks Changed Tone.” Poor Brexit tangled Britain. France24, an outfit intimately familiar with hundreds of types of fromage, reported:
In a warning sent to all British parliamentarians, MI5 accused [Christine] Lee, 58, of acting covertly and in coordination with the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party, one of Beijing’s overseas propaganda organs, by facilitating financial donations to political parties, parliamentarians and those seeking political office in the UK. The rare alert “reflects the fact that the security services are pretty worried about what China is doing in this country, both in terms of traditional espionage, which this isn’t, but also in terms of modern forms of interference and influence,” Charles Parton, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, told the Financial Times. MI5 says that Lee, a long-time resident of London, is suspected of attempting to buy the favor of prominent parliamentarians, both on the right and the left of the political spectrum.
Are the allegations true? Who knows? They do indicate that the stiff upper lip crowd is becoming more sensitive to the cracks and fissures foreign entities can use to influence certain aspects of British behavior. I wonder if Brexit was an example of foreign acupuncture? France24 is likely to provide more reports about British security “issues.”
Stephen E Arnold, January 19, 2022
A New Spin on Tech Recruitment
January 7, 2022
“Knock Knock! Who’s There? – An NSA VM” is an interesting essay for three reasons.
First, it contains a revealing statement about the NSO Group:
Significant time has passed and everyone went crazy last week with the beautiful NSO exploit VM published by Project Zero, so why not ride the wave and present a simple NSA BPF VM. It is still an interesting work and you have to admire the great engineering that goes behind this code. It’s not everyday that you can take a peek at code developed by a well funded state actor.
I noticed that the write up specifically identifies the NSO Group as a “state actor.” I think this means that NSO Group was working for a country, not the customers. This point is one that has not poked through the numerous write ups about the Israel-based company.
Second, the write up walks through a method associated with the National Security Agency. In terms of technical usefulness, one could debate whether the write up contains old news or new news. The information does make it clear that there are ideas for silent penetration of targeted systems. The targets are not specific mobile phones. It appears that the targets of the methods referenced and the sample code provided are systems higher in the food chain.
Third, the write up is actually a recruitment tool. This is not novel, but it is probably going to lead to more “look how smart and clever we are, come join us” blandishments in the near future. My hunch is that some individual, eager to up their games, will emulate the approach.
Is this method of sharing information a positive or negative? That depends on whom one asks, doesn’t it?
Stephen E Arnold, January 7, 2022
TikTok: Innocuous? Maybe Not Among Friends
January 5, 2022
Short videos. No big deal.
The data about one’s friends are a big deal. A really big deal. TikTok may be activating a network effect. “TikTok Tests Its Own Version of the Retweet with a New Repost Button” suggests that a Twitter function is chugging along. What if the “friend” is not a registered user of TikTok? Perhaps the Repost function is a way to expand a user’s social network. What can one do with such data? Building out a social graph and cross correlating those data with other information might be a high value exercise. What other uses can be made of these data a year or two down the road? That’s an interesting question to consider, particularly from the point of view of Chinese intelligence professionals.
“China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets, Documents Show” explains that China acquires data for strategic and tactical reasons. The write up doses not identify specific specialized software products, services, and tools. Furthermore, the price tags for surveillance expenditures seem modest. Nevertheless, there is a suggestive passage in the write up:
Highly sensitive viral trends online are reported to a 24-hour hotline maintained by the Cybersecurity administration of China (CAC), the body that oversees the country’s censorship apparatus…
What’s interesting is that China uses both software and human-intermediated systems.
Net net: Pundits and users have zero clue about China’s data collection activities in general. When it comes to specific apps and their functions on devices, users have effectively zero knowledge of the outflow of personal data which can be used to generate a profile for possible coercion. Pooh pooh-ing TikTok? Not a great idea.
Stephen E Arnold, January 5, 2022